Friday, July 26, 2024

Electric Vehicles are Going Nowhere Special

In my December 15th post, I wrote “fundamental sale price drops may require more to be sold than the market can support.  I predict that by November 2024 the share of electrics as American vehicles will be higher than it is now, but only about 10%, with a growing consensus that under current conditions they will not be completely or even largely taking over.”  Seven-plus months out, how are those forecasts looking?

On May 26th in Fox Business, we saw how “Buttigieg defends Biden’s EV strategy after question on how only 8 federal charging stations have been built.”  The unfortunately-placed transportation secretary was asked why, when two years ago President Biden signed a bill authorizing 500,000 such facilities to be built by 2030 and after one-quarter of the time since has elapsed, the number completed stands at .0016% of that; he reiterated the half-million goal and said there was “utility work” to be done at each, under “a new category of federal investment.”  How many have been started?  I could find information on ports, overall stations, and groups of stations with at least one under construction, but not that.

Another thing Buttigieg mentioned in the interview above was the necessity of lower electric vehicle prices.  Soon afterward, on June 3rd, the New York Times published “Electric Cars Are Suddenly Becoming Affordable” (Jack Ewing).”  The reason, though, was not higher sales providing manufacturing economies of scale, but that “customers have been snapping up used Teslas for a little over $20,000, after applying a $4,000 federal tax credit.”  That trend started with Hertz’s January-announced sale of 20,000 electric rental cars, which the market has not yet absorbed.  Ewing also mentioned, for new cars, the effect of “increased competition, lower raw-material costs and more efficient manufacturing,” but companies choosing to cut prices were pushed by Hertz, as “electric cars still cost more to manufacture than cars with internal combustion engines,” and sales would further drop without continuing subsidies.

The lack of growth has also pushed companies to build “More Gas Cars and Trucks, Fewer E.V.s as Automakers Change Plans” (Neal E. Boudette, The New York Times, July 18th).  Ford Motor Company “said it would retool a plant in Canada to produce large pickup trucks rather than the electric sport-utility vehicles it had previously planned to make there,” and the day before that, “General Motors said it expected to make 200,000 to 250,000 battery-powered cars and trucks this year, about 50,000 fewer than it had previously forecast.”  Tesla, as well, “has changed its plans because it no longer expects sales to grow 50 percent a year,” as “its global sales fell 6.6 percent in the first six months of the year.” 

And speaking of the last company mentioned, “Tesla’s Profit Fell 45% in the Second Quarter on Weak E.V. Sales” (Neal E. Boudette, The New York Times, July 23rd).  Its second-quarter year-over-year revenue increased from $24.9 billion to $25.5 billion, but its net profit fell from $2.7 billion to $1.5 billion.  That seems to confirm that its shortfall from lower selling prices is not from lower costs.  For the same interval, its number of EV’s sold dropped 4.8% and their production 14%. 

As of an Experian Automotive Market Trends fourth quarter 2023 report, only 3.3 million out of 288.8 million American vehicles were electric.  Per Edmunds, 6.9% of sales from January to May this year were the same.  Therefore, it is almost impossible to imagine the year-end share will be anywhere near 10%, let alone higher.  It looks also very doubtful that, given the news above, EV’s will be “completely or even largely taking over” – even if a Democrat wins the November presidential election.  Their percentages may substantially increase, but until then, we must project electric vehicles, with some geographical exceptions, to remain a small minority indefinitely.  If their manufacturers cut back and switch to others, and subsidies continue to prop them up, it will mean little if those in the press say they will predominate.  The lack of federal charging stations may, in the end, be just fine, and customers will get the vehicles they want.  That will work.

Friday, July 19, 2024

Four Areas of the Economy – Four Views on Them

What American economic segments have been analyzed over the past four months?

One thing dragging us down over the past several years is tariffs.  About that, David Wallace-Wells asked, in the New York Times on May 22nd, “Can Biden Actually Win This Trade War?”  I mentioned this massive increase, which was actually “a unilateral quadrupling” on Chinese electric vehicle duties, on a post about EV’s.  It seemed destructive for a president who seemed to badly want Americans to get away from gasoline and diesel cars, and, per the author here, “it’s not just EVs.  Five years after blasting (then-President Donald) Trump for imposing tariffs on Chinese exports, Biden raised them – on aluminum, steel, lithium batteries, solar cells and semiconductors, among other products.”  The damage to other environmentally favorable efforts is also great, as China’s production shares of related items include “84 percent of the world’s solar modules… 89 percent of the world's solar cells… 97 percent of its solar wafers and ingots, 86 percent each of its polysilicon and battery cells, 87 percent of its battery cathodes, 96 percent of its battery anodes, 91 percent of its battery electrodes and 85 percent of its battery separators.”  Although various “Democratic policymakers” say we should “avoid growing entirely dependent on China for clean energy,” “industrial policy isn’t guaranteed to work,” and “Trump’s imposition of tariffs on Chinese solar-panel exports in 2018 may have meaningfully slowed American renewable rollout.”  The extra charges have real potential to continue doing that.

Something around for many decades and worsening every year gets concern of various strengths every so often, but there are reasons, per Paul Krugman on June 6th in the New York Times, “Why You Shouldn’t Obsess About the National Debt.”  Although, per usdebtclock.org, it is now almost $35 trillion, or over $100,000 per citizen, Krugman calls it “a lot less scary than many imagine if you put it in historical and international context,” and making it “sustainable wouldn’t be at all hard in terms of the straight economics; it’s almost entirely a political problem.”  As a share of GDP, the author said “it’s roughly the same as it was at the end of World War II,” and is now “considerably lower” than Japan’s.  We could “stabilize debt as a percentage of G.D.P. for the next 30 years” by raising taxes or reducing spending only 2.1%.  So, the money we owe is real, but it may be dormant instead of a looming threat.

Do we have “A towering real estate crisis” (Andrew Ross Sorkin, The New York Times DealBook, June 12th)?  “The $2.4 trillion office building sector” has been hit by “sky-high interest rates and a pandemic-induced shift to remote work,” as “tenants are reducing or vacating office space to landlords at a record clip.”  As a result, “developers are looking to repurpose empty offices,” although “conversions are expensive, and not all buildings can be easily retrofitted.”  This problem may be worse than it seems, as the pendulum I have documented which swings back and forth between businesses favoring remote and in-office work is approaching the latter maximum, so it will be almost one complete cycle before office demand increases substantially, if it does at all.  Accordingly, a surplus of commercial space will seem to this generation like a permanent problem, so it needs permanent solutions.

I’m used to issuing the AJSN and basing my views using information I trust, so was not happy to see “Reliability of U.S. Economic Data Is in Jeopardy, Study Finds” (Ben Casselman, The New York Times, July 9th).  Per an American Statistical Association report, while “government statistics are reliable right now,” “that could soon change,” due to “shrinking budgets, falling survey response rates and the potential for political interference.”  Responses to the Current Population Survey, one of two providing the foundation for “the unemployment rate and other labor force statistics,” have dropped from “nearly 90 percent” ten years ago to “about 70 percent in recent months,” and those to “other government surveys” are down also.  As for the third problem, “there are few legal provisions ensuring that the statistical agencies can operate independently,” and an author of the report called for ““legislation to make this issue of professional autonomy statutory.””  We will see, and weakness here will depend on the result of the upcoming presidential election.  The same will affect the previous three items as well – along with a great deal more. 

Thursday, July 11, 2024

A Directionless Month for AI – What Do Its Scattered Reports Say?

Artificial intelligence seems to be moving into another phase, or subphase.  There have never been so many concerns, not about the technology causing a major disaster, but about it being adequate and worthwhile at all.  At the same time, there are new perceptions and more progress in related employment, and, if I am perceiving it correctly, growing acceptance that where AI is now might be where it is for months or even years, so stakeholders are realizing they cannot just wait for the next big eruption. 

A look at one chronic AI problem is the subject of “How Game Theory Can Make AI More Reliable” (Steve Nadis, Wired.com, June 9th).  The author bemoaned the tendency of large language models to give different answers, not all correct, to generative (open-ended) and discriminative (choice of options) questions.  Researchers have invented a game of sorts where “two modes” of LLMs are asked to agree on answers.  Excellence at games is a long-time AI strength, so engineers have reason to be optimistic such inconsistencies will go away.

Top AI workers are scarce, and many, soon after starting work with an organization, move on to another for more pay.  That is why, on one level, “Retention is all you need” (The Economist, June 15th).  As, per a market analyst, “20,000 companies in the West are hiring AI experts,” “AI talent, previously hoarded at tech giants, is becoming more distributed.”  Indeed, AI hiring at Amazon, Apple, Google, Meta, and Microsoft has only about broken even since the beginning of 2023.  Advertisements for many more software positions now mention AI, as do those for math, scientific research and development, and information design.

Defining another clear problem, Sherin Shibu’s “How Can AI Help Small Businesses?  It’s A Matter of Trust, According to a New Report” (Entrepreneur, June 17th), tells us that “just 7% of U.S. desk workers see AI answers as completely trustworthy,” the share of American businesses as of June was only 5% although 96% of “surveyed executives felt pressure to bring AI into their business,” and “privacy” and “data quality” were the other two top issues.  These tell AI companies where they should focus, perhaps above all other considerations.

Unsurprisingly, more universities and technical schools are preparing students for jobs using the technology.  A Brock Dumas June 17th Fox Business piece, “Want an AI career?  These colleges offer degrees for the best chance” provides a current look.  “A new study by software development firm Vention shows which U.S. colleges are offering bachelor’s degrees with the best chance of landing a job fresh out of school – and the potential for the biggest paychecks.”  The top five were California Polytechnic State University, Wake Forest University in North Carolina, Trinity University in Texas, Clarkson University in New York state, and Knox College in Illinois.  There are more, and this list will change, but these may be the ones currently most worth investigating.

Also, for now, “We’re Still Waiting for the Next Big Leap in AI” (Will Knight, Wired.com, June 20th).  Knight wrote that “the world is still waiting for another AI leap forward… akin to that delivered by GPT-4” 16 months ago.  He described possible contenders, but then concluded “it’s unclear how long the world must wait for that next big leap in AI.  OpenAI has said it has started training its next big model.  In the meantime, we will need to figure out new ways to measure how useful the technology really is.”

On June 27th, Fox News released “US tops world ratings for AI preparedness:  China, Russia and Iran lag in key measures, report finds” (Peter Aitken).  The rankings were on countries’ “ability to immediately adopt artificial intelligence… into their economies.”  The American “value of preparedness” tied the Netherlands, and was followed by Finland, Estonia, New Zealand, Germany, Sweden, Australia, Japan, and Israel.  That may or may not prove to be valuable information.

There must be something noteworthy about a source called Futurism.com having the most consistently negative AI articles of anyone.  Here are two more.  The first is “There’s a Small Problem with the AI Industry:  It’s Making Absolutely No Money” (July 4th).  Author Sharon Adarlo noted that “Goldman Sachs analysts have concluded… that AI just isn’t making any serious money yet,” and that “Goldman found that companies that hoped to profit from using AI to boost productivity – ranging from H&R Block to Walmart – have seen their shares vastly underperform the broader stock market since the tail end of 2022.”  She also found that “the only companies making much actual revenue off AI are the ones selling the hardware it needs, like Nvidia.”  While “companies using it want to see major returns,” “so far, it sounds like they aren’t.  Maybe the real question is how much runway the AI industry has before business leaders move onto the next thing.”  This piece is consistent with my previous comments.

The second Futurism.com piece was “Expert Warns That AI Industry Due for Huge Collapse” (Victor Tangermann, July 9th).  He named a “founding partner” at a “macroeconomic research firm” calling AI “completely unproven,” saying that its hallucinations may never go away and that it was “too energy hungry,” along with a previous Stability AI CEO telling bankers that “this will be the biggest bubble of all time.”  Hardly universal views, but with merit.

Overall, is it true that, per New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman on July 9th, “the artificial intelligence revolution of the past four years is widely expected to slam into the white-collar job market in the next four like a Category 5 hurricane”?  We don’t know that.  As with actual storms, we will benefit from tracking them and projecting their courses and times of landfall, but this one is way too weak and distant to fear.  We don’t need to buy flashlights, batteries, and water, and may never need to.  The future of artificial intelligence is still up in the air – and it may never come down.

Friday, July 5, 2024

Jobs in June: Seasonal Worsenings Mostly Offset Elsewhere, with AJSN Showing Latent Demand Up Almost Half a Million

The published projections I saw for this morning's Bureau of Labor Statistics Employment Situation Summary was that it would be worse than for May’s data a month ago.  The two estimates of net new nonfarm payroll positions were 190,000 and 200,000, and unemployment might be going up again.  So what happened?

Employment as above, at plus 206,000, was quite close to the predictions.  Seasonally adjusted joblessness had its third straight 0.1% gain, to 4.1%, with the corresponding total of people up 200,000 to 6.8 million.  (We now can ignore when the BLS says something “changed little.”)  Long-term unemployed, for 27 weeks or longer, gained 100,000 to 1.5 million, up 36% from June 2023, with so many people joining the labor force that its participation rate increased, 0.1% to 62.6%.  The measure of how many Americans are actually working, the employment-population ratio, stayed at 60.1%.  The count of those working part-time for economic reasons, or holding onto shorter-hours positions while looking for full-time ones, shed 200,000 to get to 4.2 million.  Average private nonfarm payroll earnings rose 9 cents per hour, close to the inflation rate, to $35.00.

Since May and June have different employment characteristics, the seasonally unadjusted figures did not match the others.  Unemployment that way jumped 0.6% to 4.3%.  The count of those not interested in working lost 637,000 to 93,776,000.  Those employed rose 433,000 to 161,774,000.

The American Job Shortage Number or AJSN, the statistic showing how many additional positions could be quickly filled if all knew they would be easy and routine to get, was up 478,000, as follows:


The share of the AJSN from those officially jobless was 4.3% higher at 37.7%.  Compared with a year earlier, the AJSN grew 504,000, with almost 800,000 more from unemployment partially equalized by, among others, 174,000 from fewer people wanting work but not looking for it for a year or more, and 200,000 fewer from expatriates. 

What patterns can we get from this report?  The new jobs, once again plentiful and nothing to take for granted, went largely to people with statuses other than simple unemployment.  Many more people returned to the labor market, and enough were unsuccessful to bring overall joblessness up.  A goodly number of those without work are not finding it, even after six months away.  Latent demand is not only alive and well but increasing.  Still, June is a tougher month than May, and the smaller, marginal categories show that this was, overall, a good one.  The turtle took a moderate step forward.