Wednesday, November 26, 2025

September’s Jobs Report – Months Ago Now, with Mild Changes – AJSN Now 16.9 Million

Between the government shutdown and my own outage, we’re about eight weeks later for this one than we usually are, but it still has something meaningful to say.  What?

The number of net new nonfarm payroll positions in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Employment Situation Summary came in at 119,000, not huge but strongly positive and exceeding a few estimates.  Seasonally adjusted unemployment was 4.4%, up 0.1%, and the unadjusted variety, reflecting work increases in September, fell from 4.5% to 4.3%, with the unadjusted count of those with jobs up 606,000, just more than last time’s loss, similarly moving to 163,894,000.  The two measures showing how many Americans are working or only one step away, the employment-population ratio and the labor force participation rate, each gained 0.1% to 59.7% and 62.4%.  The count of those working part-time for economic reasons, or looking thus far unsuccessfully for full-time labor while keeping at least one part-time proposition, was down 100,000 to 4.8 million, as was the number of people officially unemployed for 27 weeks or longer, reaching 1.8 million.  Average private hourly nonfarm payroll earnings rose 14 cents, a bit more than inflation, to $36.67.

The American Job Shortage Number or AJSN, the Royal Flush Press statistic showing how many additional positions could be quickly filled if all knew they would be easy to get, lost 844,000, mostly seasonally, to get to the following:

 

Less than half of the drop was from lower unemployment – more was from a large cut in those reporting they wanted to work but had not looked for it during the previous year.  The other factors changed little.  Year-over-year, the AJSN increased 316,000, with unemployment up since September 2024 and those not wanting work adding 115,000.  The share of the AJSN from official joblessness shrank 0.3% to 38.9%.

What happened this time?  Not a great deal, and barely better than neutral.  Those not interested in work rose 750,000, which with August’s 860,000 meant over 1.6 million over two months, which is a lot.  Otherwise, everything reasonably hung on.  There will be no October AJSN or Employment Situation Summary, but you can expect November’s writeup to appear here on the next jobs report’s December 16th release date.  For now, the turtle managed only a tiny step forward.

Thursday, November 13, 2025

Artificial Intelligence Going Wrong: Eleven Weeks of Real or Questionable Problems

Somewhere between AI’s accomplishments and its postulated threats to humanity are things with it that have gone wrong, and concerns that something might.  Here are nine – almost one per week since the end of August.

A cuddly danger?  In “Experts warn AI stuffed animals could ‘fundamentally change’ human brain wiring in kids” (Fox News, August 31st), Kurt Knutsson reported that “pediatric experts warn these toys could trade human connection for machine conversation.”  Although television has been doing that for generations, some think that with AI playthings, “kids may learn to trust machines more than people,” which could damage “how kids build empathy, learn to question, and develop critical thinking.”  All of this is possible, but speculative, and nothing in this piece convinced me AI toys’ effect would be much more profound than TV’s.

A good if preliminary company reaction was the subject of “OpenAI rolls out ChatGPT parental controls with help of mental health experts” (Rachel Wolf, Fox Business, September 2nd).  In response to a ChatGPT-facilitated suicide earlier this year, “over the next 120 days… parents will be able to link their accounts with their teens’ accounts, control how ChatGPT responds to their teen, manage memory and chat history features and receive notifications if their child is using the technology in a moment of acute distress.”  That will be valuable from the beginning, and will improve from there.

On another problem front, “Teen sues AI tool maker over fake nude images” (Kurt Knutsson, Fox News, October 25th).  The defendant, AI/Robotics Venture Strategy 3 Ltd., makes a product named ClothOff, which can turn a photo into a simulated nude, keeping the original face.  A plaintiff’s classmate did that to one of hers, shared it, and “the fake image quickly spread through group chats and social media.”  As of the article’s press time, “more than 45 states have passed or proposed laws to make deepfakes without consent a crime,” and “in New Jersey,” where this teenager was living, “creating or sharing deceptive AI media can lead to prison time and fines.”  Still, “legal experts say this case could set a national precedent, as “judges must decide whether AI developers are responsible when people misuse their tools” and “need to consider whether the software itself can be an instrument of harm.”  The legal focus here may need to be on sharing such things, not just creating or possessing them, which will prove to be impossible to stop.

In a Maryland high school, “Police swarm student after AI security system mistakes bag of chips for gun” (Bonny Chu, Fox News, October 26th).  Oops!  This was perpetrated by “an artificial intelligence gun detection system,” which ended up “leaving officials and students shaken,” as, per the student, “police showed up, like eight cop cars, and they all came out with guns pointed.”  I advise IT tool companies to do their beta testing in their labs, not in live high school parking lots.

Was the action taken by the firm in the third paragraph above sufficient?  No, Steven Adler said, in “I Worked at OpenAI.  It’s Not Doing Enough to Protect People” (The New York Times, October 28th).  Although the company “ultimately prohibited (its) models from being used for erotic purposes,” and its CEO claimed about the parental-control feature above that it “had been able to “mitigate” these issues,” per Adler it “has a history of paying too little attention to established risks,” and that it needs to use “sycophancy tests” and “commit to a consistent schedule of publicly reporting its metrics for tracking mental health issues.”  I expect that the AI-producing firms will increasingly do such things.  And more are in progress, such as “Leading AI company to ban kids from chatbots after lawsuit blames app for child’s death” (Bonny Chu, Fox Business, October 30th).  The firm here, Character.ai, which is “widely used for role-playing and creative storytelling with virtual characters,” said that “users under 18 will no longer be able to engage in open-ended conversations with its virtual companions starting Nov. 24.”  They will also restrict minors from having more than 2 daily hours of “chat time.”

In the October 29th New York Times, Anastasia Berg tried to show us “Why Even Basic A.I. Use Is So Bad for Students.”  Beyond academic cheating, “seemingly benign functions” such as AI-generated summaries, “are the most pernicious for developing minds,” as that stunts the meta-skill of being able to summarize things themselves.  Yet the piece contains its own refutation, as “Plato warned against writing,” since “literate human beings… would not use their memories.”  Technology, from 500 BC to 2025 AD, has always brought tradeoffs.  As calculators have made some arithmetic unnecessary but have hardly extinguished the need to know and use it, while people may indeed be weaker at summarizing formal material, they will continue to have no choice but to do that while living the rest of their lives.

We’re getting more legal action than that mentioned above, as “Lawsuits Blame ChatGPT for Suicides and Harmful Delusions” (Kashmir Hill, The New York Times, November 6th).  Seven cases were filed that day alone, three on behalf of users who killed themselves after extensive ChatGPT involvement, another with suicide plans, two with mental breakdowns, and one saying the software had encouraged him to be delusional.  As before, this company will need to ongoingly refine its safeguards, or it may not survive at all.                  

I end with another loud allegation, this one from Brian X. Chen, who told us, also in the November 6th New York Times, “How A.I. and Social Media Contribute to ‘Brain Rot.’”   He started noting that “using A.I.-generated summaries” got less specific information than through “traditional Google” searches, and continued to say that those who used “chatbots and A.I. search tools for tasks like writing essays and research” were “generally performing worse than people who don’t use them.”  All of that, though, when it means using AI as a substitute for personal work, is obvious, and not “brain rot.”  This article leaves open the question of whether the technology hurts when it is being used to help, not to write.

Three conclusions on the above jump out.  First, as AI progresses it will also bring along problems.  Second, legally and socially acceptable AI considerations are continuing to be defined and to evolve, and we’re nowhere near done yet.  Third, fears of adverse mental and cognitive effects from general use are, thus far, unsubstantiated.  Artificial intelligence will bring us a lot, both good and bad, and we will, most likely, excel at profiting from the former and stopping the latter.

Friday, November 7, 2025

Artificial Intelligence’s Power, Water, and Land Uses, What’s Coming Next, and What Might Remain After a Business Bloodbath

How big has the AI buildup been?  What major problem with that is on the way?  If AI proves to be a bubble, what of value would stay? 

The oldest piece here, “AI energy demand in US will surge but also provide opportunity to manage energy” (Aislinn Murphy, Fox Business, April 18th) told us that “the world, particularly the United States, is projected to see a massive jump in data center and artificial intelligence demand for electricity by 2030, per a recently released International Energy Agency (IEA) report.”  That happened not only in five years but within six months, though we can’t yet vouch for the prediction that “renewable energy sources will meet nearly half of the additional demand, followed by natural gas and coal, with nuclear starting to play an increasing important role.”

With that, let’s look at “What AI’s insatiable appetite for power means for our future” (Kurt Knutsson, Fox News, June 20th).  Even less than five months ago, “the modern AI boom” was “pushing our power grid to its limits,” as “the energy needed to support artificial intelligence is rising so quickly that it has already delayed the retirement of several coal plants in the U.S., with more delays expected,” and “energy is becoming the next major bottleneck.”  As the previous author also wrote, power is going for “running” it “at scale,” for current use of the technology, not for creating models for future releases.  Perhaps unexpectedly, 30% to 55% “of a data center’s total power use” goes to “keeping AI servers from overheating,” and, overall, “the demand for AI is growing faster than the energy grid can adapt.”  Despite pledges to use renewable energy, much of that may be nuclear instead of wind, solar, or hydro, and even if not, “because the grid is shared, fossil fuels often fill the gap when renewables aren’t available.”

In “At Amazon’s Biggest Data Center, Everything Is Supersized for A.I.” (June 24th, The New York Times), Karen Weise and Cade Metz reported that “a year ago, a 1,200-acre stretch of farmland outside New Carlisle, Ind., was an empty cornfield.  Now, seven Amazon data centers rise up from the rich soil, each larger than a football stadium.”  The company plans to build about 23 more there “over the next several years,” which “will consume 2.2 gigawatts of electricity – enough to power a million homes,” along with “millions of gallons of water to keep the chips from overheating.”  When fully constructed, this facility “will be the largest power user in the state of Indiana by a country mile.”

People connected with rural areas may not mind the jobs and money such projects bring, but per Ivan Penn and Karen Weise in the August 14th New York Times, “Big Tech’s A.I. Data Centers Are Driving Up Electricity Bills for Everyone.”  Even though “Amazon, Google, Microsoft and other technology companies” are moving “into the energy business,” “the average electricity rate for residents has risen more than 30 percent since 2020,” and as “recent reports expect data centers will require expensive upgrades to the electric grid,” “A.I. could turbocharge those increases,” “unless state regulators and lawmakers force tech companies to cover those expenses.” 

Similarly, “AI Isn’t Free.  The First Costs Are on Your Bill, and More Are Coming” (Kay Rubacek, The Epoch Times, September 24th).  With rising electric costs common nationwide, “despite the technological advancements, computing power is not getting more efficient in terms of power usage.  It is becoming ever more energy-hungry.”  As such, “the Department of Energy now warns of a hundred-fold increase in blackout risk by 2030 if data center growth continues and plants keep closing on schedule,” yet “experts cannot accurately predict (AI’s) future costs because the technology is changing too fast.”

General-public reactions to AI power and water use are coming in.  They are often not positive, as “AI Data Centers Create Fury from Mexico to Ireland” (Paul Mozur et al., The New York Times, October 20th).  “In country after country, activists, residents and environmental organizations have banded together to oppose data centers,” but “there are few signs of a slowdown,” as, per bank UBS, “companies are expected to spend $375 billion on data centers globally this year and $500 billion in 2026.”  In Ireland in particular, where “a third of the country’s electricity is expected to go to data centers in the next few years, up from 5 percent in 2015,” the “welcoming mood has soured,” and it has now “become one of the clearest examples of the transnational backlash against data centers,” as “a protest movement has grown.”  “Impoverished small towns” in Mexico near where data centers have appeared have “began experiencing longer water shortages and more blackouts.”

It is clear from all this that the rubber of increased AI infrastructure is meeting the road of damage to residents.  There will be vastly more conflict next year, much of it, even in the United States as protests multiply, preventing data centers from being built.  That will become yet another problem for the technology to overcome, and will push costs even higher.

I have been reading about the possibility of a severe artificial intelligence downturn, and comparisons and contrasts with what happened almost 200 years ago with railroads.  Then, the failed companies left behind track, bridges, and stations that were later used when the industry reconstructed itself.  What would AI abandon?  Failed companies’ data center buildings would remain, but the chips would, as now, be worthless well under a decade later.  While the news that it is not upgrades driving current resource usage is heartening, and the chance of what is now a vast number of profitable and worthwhile applications disappearing is almost nonexistent, companies going bust could mean the end of tens of trillions in market capitalization.  It’s easy to imagine effects such as a 50% NASDAQ-index fall.  Yet those gigantic physical structures will still be useful.  How, we don’t know, but they will be, one way or another.

Still No AJSN

 Until data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics becomes available, there will be no further editions of the American Job Shortage Number.  If the November data is available by December 4th, the November version will be posted December 5th as previously expected.  I will put together and release the September and October editions, on dates to be determined, if the BLS publishes back data supporting them.

Friday, October 31, 2025

Scary Monsters, aka Physical Artificial Intelligence: Five Months’ Progress with Robots

This AI subarea is not only one of the oldest, but the most graphically visible.  And, in honor of our publication date, the closest to monsters.  But how good are they really?

We start with “Delivery robot autonomously lifts, transports heavy cargo” (Kurt Knutsson, Fox News, May 26th).  So you don’t want to pay those mid-six-figure incomes to union dock workers, or even way over $100k to UPS package handlers?  This technology, LEVA, can “load and unload cargo boxes without any human help” by “securing the box,” then lifting “itself back up and” carrying “the load to its destination,” handling up to 187 pounds and dealing with stairs and “rough terrain” on the way.  Alas, nothing here about availability.

Dealing with a current problem, “John Deere addresses farm labor shortages with autonomous tractors” (Sophia Compton, Fox Business, also May 26th).  Although they have been made in at least prototype form for almost four years, we can’t tell from this article if, or when, you can buy one.

More clearly in the present tense is “Humanoid robots handle quality checks and assembly at auto plant” (Kurt Knutsson, Fox News, June 24th).  “Kepler Robotics has officially introduced its Forerunner K2 “Bumblebee” humanoid robot at the SAIC-GM automotive plant in Shanghai… in a recently released video, the K2 is seen moving confidently through the plant, performing detailed quality checks, and handling assembly operations that demand both strength and precision.”  It “can load stamped parts, manipulate mechanical fixtures, and adapt to new tasks using a combination of imitation and reinforcement learning.”  In addition to “tactile manipulators with an impressive 11 degrees of freedom per hand, and flexible fingertip sensors that boost its dexterity,” it “leverages a cloud-based cognitive system that enables it to learn new tasks quickly and coordinate its movements with full-body awareness.”  Fundamentally, largely because of AI, better than the industrial robots of decades ago.

Continuing along more general but similar lines, from the same author and source, “Job-killing robot learns at work, and it’s coming to the factory floor” (July 5th).  Although the previous example would match the title, this time it’s Hexagon’s AEON, also “humanoid” and designed for “handling repetitive and error-prone tasks,” which allows “raising the bar for productivity and workplace safety.”  It uses Microsoft Azure and “Maxon’s advanced actuators” to get “remarkable agility and dexterity,” along with “spatial awareness,” and its “intelligence grows over time thanks to a self-learning loop.”  But no availability information, and described by Knutsson as “new.”

Did you know that “There Are More Robots Working in China Than the Rest of the World Combined” (Meaghan Tobin and Keith Bradsher, The New York Times, September 25th)?  That was “more than two million… in Chinese factories last year,” per the International Federation of Robotics, with 300,000 “new” ones.  Charts of “annual installations of industrial robots,” one for China and one for “rest of world,” show the second one way ahead from 2015 to 2019, somewhat higher in 2020, and behind from 2021 to 2024.  Because of a “national push,” “over the past decade, China has embarked on a broad campaign to use more robots in its factories, become a major maker of robots and combine the industry with advances in artificial intelligence,” and now has “five times as many robots working in its factories as the United States.”

This time’s stunning speed achievement is from a product that “is a collaboration between Crest Robotics and Earthbuilt Technology, “Australian construction robot Charlotte can 3D print 2,150-sq-ft home in one day using sustainable materials” (Kurt Knutsson, Fox News, October 12th).  The author described that as “the speed of more than 100 bricklayers working simultaneously.”  The material it uses “comes from sand, crushed brick and recycled glass,” forming “a structure that’s fireproof, floodproof and created with a far smaller carbon footprint than traditional building methods.”  Its “future versions” could even build “moon bases for research and exploration.”  Until then, though, it needs to become available, as it, representations to the contrary, “may be years away from building its first full-scale home.”

Apparently in progress now, though, are “The Robots Fueling Amazon’s Automation” (Karen Weise, The New York Times, October 21st).  In that company’s “most advanced warehouse in Shreveport, La., employees touch products at just a few stages, such as taking them out of shipping boxes and placing them in bins,” whereupon “the Sparrow robotic arm looks into a bin of items, picks the one it wants and puts it in another bin,” sometime after which “the robotic arm called Robin places packed packages on a small robot called Pegasus, which shuttles packages to drop down specific chutes depending on where they will be shipped.”  After that, robots sort them and “autonomously” take “them to shipping docks.”  No doubt there will be further improvements, and perhaps more steps automated.

How can it be that “Robots power breakthrough in pregnancy research, boosting IVF success rates” (Angelica Stabile, Fox News, October 23rd)?  The automata “assist in the (in-vitro fertilization) lab,” which incorporates a great deal of other AI, by “preparing specialized plates to sustain embryos,” at which they are “10 times more precise in preparing (them) than humans.”

These are wonderful developments.  My only gripe is that, as so often happens in the information technology field, the difference between current and projected future obtainability is often blurred.  Is it fair to credit a product with being able to do something, if it has not been publicly rolled out?  What steps remain for the manufacturers of, in the cases above, LEVA, robotic tractors, AEON, and Charlotte to sell their products commercially?  How much low-error time after that would it take for the makers, and us, to declare their product productively deployed?  We don’t have much for answers to any of these.  Until we do, or see successful robotic sales and deployment, we should limit credit to the Amazons, Bumblebees, and IVF robots.  The other companies can see why – if they can get there, we’ll do the same for them.

Friday, October 24, 2025

Electric Vehicles – Almost One Year’s Telling Stories

It’s been the quietest year of several for electric vehicles.  Are they settling down, or just reacting to changing governmental policies?  How predominant, if at all, will they be late this decade and beyond?

To set the tone for 2025, we saw “Tesla Annual Sales Slip for First Time as Competition Grows” (Jack Ewing, The New York Times, January 2nd).  They “fell slightly in 2024” for “the first annual decline in the company’s history, as rivals in China, Europe and the United States introduced dozens of competing electric models.”  Total Tesla deliveries were off about 1% to 1.789 million, and, as of press time, “still accounts for nearly half of all electric cars sold in” America. 

The next was even gloomier, as Ivan Penn asked if “Electric Vehicles Died a Century Ago.  Could That Happen Again?” (The New York Times, May 26th).  The author’s reasons for concerns were that “The Trump administration and Republicans in Congress are working to undercut the growth of electric vehicles, impose a new tax on them and swing federal policy sharply in favor of oil and gasoline.”  He mentioned that “the oil industry has enjoyed numerous tax breaks,” but electric cars, starting with their now-discontinued buyer subsidies, have as well.  He focused on EV’s being less “macho,” but there has been much more than that to why “electric cars may be                                                                         in trouble, at least in the United States.”

“The EVs We’ve Lost” (Wired.com, July 19th) told us that “shifts in economic policy and manufacturing have led major automakers to cancel upcoming electric vehicle launches in the US.”  Whatever it is, consulting company AlixPartners “dropped its 2030 sales predictions for battery-electric and hybrid card by a whopping 46 percent compared to last year’s projections.”  With that, the following, many of which have been absorbing money for several years, will not be produced: Ford Three-Row EV SUV, Honda Five and Seven-Seat EV SUV, Mercedes-Benz MB.EA-Large Platform, Nissan and Infiniti EV Sedans, Volvo All-EV Lineup, Maserati MC20 Folgore, Apple Car, and Fisker Pear.  These are still in progress, but believed delayed: Buick EV, Ferrari EV 2, Lamborghini Lanzador, Lamborghini Urus, Porsche 718 EV, and Tesla Model 2.  That’s a lot.

Something healthy, and good for electric car buyers, is that we are seeing “Used E.V. Sales Take Off as Prices Plummet” (Jack Ewing, The New York Times, September 13).  In contrast to delivery numbers above, “sales of used electric vehicles rose 40 percent in July from a year earlier, according to Cox Automotive, a research firm.”  Those too, though, were subsidized, with customers “rushing to take advantage of a $4,000 tax credit that can be applied to used electric vehicles that sell for $25,000 or less.”  Used sales prices will be a good indicator of how highly EVs are desired by people who don’t already have one, which is perhaps obvious but reveals valuable information about the extent of their market.

As September rolled to a close, we got the judgment that “Electric Vehicles Face a ‘Pretty Dreadful Year’ in the U.S.” (Neal E. Boudette, The New York Times, September 29th).  The author, backed up by analysts, expected that the end of various federal tax credits that month would cause sales figures “to plummet in the last three months of the year and then remain sluggish for some time,” as that and other industry developments show “a stark turnaround from the heady days a few years ago when many automakers believed electric vehicles were poised to take off.”  Additional manufacturer cancellations named here included Honda’s electric Acura, Stellantis’s “battery-powered” Ram pickup, and importing of Nissan’s Japanese Ariya electric SUV.

It was time for another writeup on “How Much It Costs to Drive an E.V. and a Gas Car in Every State,” and, courtesy of Francesca Paris and the October 8th New York Times, we got one.  It, however, considered only fuel cost, so anyone serious about this issue will need to assemble and properly interpret data on depreciation and other expenses.  This study, though, found that charging or filling up for 100 miles ran averages of $5.26 for home electricity, $6.15 for hybrids, $12.80 for “standard” gas cars, and $15.62 for “fast charging.”  Factors mentioned for possible individual consideration were “cheaper electricity rates at night or for E.V.’s,” home charging when power comes from solar panels, regional electricity-cost differences favoring some west-of-the-Mississippi states, different gasoline prices, and differing fast-charging rates.  The states with the cheapest, relative to gas, home-charging prices were all in the West, with the most expensive five all in New England.  When gas was compared with fast charging, the most favorable to EVs were Florida and four in the Pacific, while the worst were scattered: Arkansas, Wyoming, the District of Columbia, Vermont, and Maine.  It is noteworthy that New England, which culturally is one of the areas most favorable to electric cars, has the most expensive electricity, and the mountain states of the West are opposite in both ways.

What overall?  Even without the subsidy losses, electric vehicles, in the United States, were not poised to become the norm.  They seem solid as a minority preference, but that’s all we, automakers, legislators, and presidential hopefuls should expect.  They have more gyrations to go through before we know just how large a share they will command, but it won’t be a majority.  On that the data, tangled though it may seem, can agree.

Friday, October 17, 2025

What’s Happening with Driverless Cars, Good and Bad

Although from a late-teens perspective autonomous vehicles haven’t done much of anything, as I have reported they are succeeding in several cities.  What else has been going on with them?

In what should be good news, “GM restarts driverless car program more than a year after Cruise robotaxi incident” (Greg Wehner, Fox Business, August 11th).  In a one-off event well before their decision to leave, “a Cruise Origin robotaxi… struck and dragged a woman about 20 feet.”  The automaker claimed here they’re “accelerating the development of autonomous driving technology capable of operating without human oversight,” and per Bloomberg will “be focusing on developing driverless cars for personal use instead of for a robotaxi service.”  As the firm’s “sources… reportedly” said, “the first steps should be to develop hands-free and eyes-free driving with a human inside the vehicle, but ultimately the company is working to have a car that can drive without anyone at the wheel.”  That sounds like returning to where they were, if probably incorporating improvements the taxis have discovered.

Soon thereafter, we watched as “Stellantis hits the brakes on Level 3 autonomous driving tech over soaring costs” (Nora Eckert, USA Today, August 26th).  That wasn’t defined in the article, except that it “enables drivers to have their hands off the wheel and eyes off the road under certain conditions,” which “would allow them to temporarily watch movies, catch up on emails, or read books.”  That sort of thing seems scarier than it did even years ago, and indeed was “never launched,” but the company “stopped short of saying that the program was canceled.”  Clearly an indefinite delay.

Per Charlemagne in the September 6th Economist, such technology is important enough that we can call the continent’s slow pace with it “Europe’s Sputnik Moment.”  Robotaxis, which are “starting to feel humdrum in Guangzhou or Phoenix” remain perceived as “science fiction in Warsaw or Rome,” as they are “barely being tested” there, and exemplify “how far the continent has fallen behind” and how “Europe has become too dependent on China and America.”  However, this interpretation is unfair, since cities with robotaxis have new road and highway systems and generally fine weather.  I have heard nothing about them being planned for New York or Boston, in which self-driving vehicles would fare little better than in the much older cities across the Atlantic, and as well have more people walking and using public transportation.

“The one thing that’s free in Las Vegas – but it requires taking a gamble” (Deirdre Bardolf, Fox News, September 21st) is a ride on a Zoox robotaxi, provided by Amazon.  The vehicles, which distinctively look like “toaster(s) on wheels,” have been available for just over five weeks, before which they progressed from serving “company employees” to helping “friends and family members,” before opening to “anyone with the Zoox app.”  At press time, Zoox was “collecting rider feedback, testing its user interface, refining its pickup and drop-off infrastructure and working to gain the public trust in driverless transportation.”  All strongly positive, even in a city with conditions, as above, unusually well suited to robotaxis.

Forbes, though, printed something called “Tesla’s Full-Self Driving Software is A Mess.  Should It Be Legal?” (Alan Ohnsman, September 23rd).  In order for company CEO Elon Musk to get “his jaw-dropping $1 trillion pay package,” he must put “1 million Tesla robotaxis on the road and 10 million active (full self-driving) users over the next decade” – a tall order for technology described as “error-prone,” as during an hour-and-a-half Los Angeles test it “ignored some standard traffic signs and posted speed limits, didn’t slow at a pedestrian crossing with a flashing sign and people present, made pointless lane changes and accelerated at odd times, such as while exiting a crowded freeway with a red light at the end of the ramp.”  One observer called it ”just a prototype” and said “it’s not a product,” yet it stays as “driving-assist systems are unregulated.”  The previous paragraph gave; this one took away.  A week later, we saw “Two US senators urge probe of Tesla’s Full Self Driving response to rail crossings” (David Shepardson, Reuters), in response to “a growing number of reported near-collisions.”

“When a Driverless Car Makes an Illegal U-Turn, Who Gets the Ticket?” (Michael Levenson and Laurel Rosenhall, The New York Times, October 1st).  Two policemen in San Bruno, California, “saw a car make an illegal U-turn right in front of them,” but “a ticket couldn’t be issued,” since, although “California approved a law last year allowing the police to cite autonomous vehicles,” it isn’t in force yet, “did not specify any penalties,” and “citation books don’t have a box for ‘robot.’”  Indeed, “there are no clear rules in California,” although “Arizona has a state law that allows the police to issue traffic citations to driverless vehicles, just as they would to regular drivers.”

What can we make of this motley collection?  One takeaway is that robotaxis, when in their carefully chosen environments, are doing superbly.  Another is that elsewhere they are not, erring with such as obeying signs that I would have thought the software’s 2010s closed-course training would have long resolved.  A third is that those programming and implementing autonomous vehicle technology need to change some things they are doing.  Until the results improve, driverless software will be limited to robotaxis and, with warnings to them to never stop paying attention, in cars with drivers.  Could all that substantially improve?  Maybe in a year, maybe not in ten.  Don’t bet on it – unless the odds you get are good enough.