Friday, August 28, 2026

Artificial Intelligence’s Effect on Getting Jobs - What’s Been Happening to the Extent That We Can Tell, and the Outlook

A hot topic ever since AI jumped up to the headlines, a few years ago, is still drawing ink.

“California’s Governor Signs A.I. Order Aimed at Protecting Workers” (Cecilia Kang, The New York Times, May 21st) related not quite that, but one intended “to explore a broad overhaul of labor policies, an attempt to front run a potential mass job displacement caused by artificial intelligence.”  One thing it did nail down, though, was “an expansion of job training programs, particularly for white-collar workers like customer service representatives, software developers and marketing and sales people.”  With one overlap there are “The Hidden Workers Most Threatened by A.I.” (Ben Casselman, The New York Times, June 10th,” which also included “bookkeepers, payroll clerks and human resources specialists who fly under the radar but collectively account for tens of millions of jobs.”  Although a researcher said she was concerned that “A.I. will be to high-school-educated women what deindustrialization was to high-school-educated men,” but, as “there is little firm evidence that A.I. has hurt the labor market as a whole,” “such an outcome is a fear, not a forecast.”

Parallel to the conflict above was that “53% of Americans fear AI could take their jobs, poll finds” (Rachel Barber, USA Today, June 10th).  That number actually included worry about “someone in their household,” and was “consistent across age, gender and education levels, though Democrats were more likely than Republicans to express concern.”

Also, “Big Companies Aim to East A.I. Transition for American Workers” (Lydia DePillis, The New York Times, June 25th).  Although “the White House, excited about the upside for stocks and investment, has downplayed the potential for widespread job losses,” “a group of employers, state governors and foundations has raised $500 million to” come up with conclusions about what AI regulation we need.  The consortium, Raise Us, “will work primarily with governors, starting with those in Utah, Arkansas, Maryland and Connecticut,” and “plans to furnish technical assistance for companies that want to retain workers as A.I. changes their roles, rather than eliminating them.”  Valuable, especially if others, as I noted recently, continue dragging their feet on this critical issue.

What is happening now?  Ben Casselman, in the New York Times, said that “A.I. Is Reshaping the Economy.  Good Luck Measuring How” (July 2nd).  Although “pretty much everyone agrees that artificial intelligence has the potential to reshape the economy in the coming decades… no one is sure what effect the technology is having right now.”  “According to some measures, A.I. is contributing to high unemployment rates among new graduates and might already have destroyed tens of thousands of jobs.  Other sources suggest companies might actually be adding workers as a result of the technology.”  It “might be contributing to the U.S. inflation problem, or part of the solution to it.”  As well, “it might be responsible for a recent pickup in productivity growth, or might be playing virtually no role.”  And, if these possibilities seem easier to choose between, “researchers can’t even agree on basic questions like how many companies are using A.I. or which workers are most vulnerable to the disruptions it could cause.”  What a mess!  It is no surprise, then, that a think tank director “published a report documenting the challenge of A.I. measurement and proposing steps to improve it.”  In the meantime, per an economist, “it’s like going to the doctor and getting three different diagnoses for the same condition.”

What is “The Work of Helping A.I. Destroy Work” (Lora Kelley, also in the Times, July 10th)?  “Every day, Mercor, a start-up that sells training data to artificial intelligence companies, pays 30,000 contractors more than $4 million to help make their jobs, and those of their colleagues, obsolete.”  The people Mercor needs are highly specific, such as “a voice actor able to maintain a customer service persona in fluent Hebrew,” “a Ph.D. physicist with a specialization in general relativity, astrophysics or cosmology,” and “a physician with more than three years of experience in the Rwandan primary care medical system.”  If the company gets the gig workers they need, there will be some obscure corners with remarkably high-quality AI interactions.

As expected, changes that affect people get reactions, such as what Jessica Grose wrote about:   “The Hunt for a Job Has Never Been Worse.  These Applicants Are Fighting Back” (The New York Times, July 18th).  She called our current setup “the purgatory job market of 2026, in which potential employees are largely evaluated by automated systems, engage in chatbot interviews and, even then, often get no feedback.”  The problem is that “as employers continue to use A.I. to rationalize the process of identifying strong applicants, applicants have begun to use similar tools to game the systems evaluating them,” creating a “vicious cycle” of “a futile “Spy vs. Spy” showdown instead of a useful way to meet the ostensible goal of giving qualified people jobs.”  As laziness is a powerful force, I do not expect much relief through in-person involvement here, so we can expect more bad times for both jobseekers and employers, who “are still having trouble finding genuinely skilled and appropriate employees” while getting “way too many résumés to evaluate.”

The common thread, then, is that AI is rarely helping people get jobs.  Will that continue indefinitely?  Will it somehow improve?  I doubt it, and think we can expect this situation to further feed AI discontent.  So this is another thing artificial intelligence must improve on.  Don’t count on it.

Friday, August 21, 2026

USA vs. China: A Big Artificial Intelligence Showdown, With One Possible Newfangled Solution

Received just as I was starting to write this post, in Anna’s Daybreak News on August 20th:  “China is closing the AI gap with the U.S., and in some areas leads on usage and cost.  Chinese models now account for 41.4% of generative-model downloads on Hugging Face and over 60% of global market share on OpenRouter…  U.S. firms still hold a computing edge” (credited to Bloomberg).

Fine, but what does all that really mean?  And what’s been in the press since early May?

A viewpoint from Jacob Dreyer, in the May 9th New York Times: “America’s A.I. is Futuristic.  China Is Just Making It Work.”  The author, living in Shanghai, said that ‘In China, surveillance technology and A.I. surround our everyday life,” from obtaining groceries from seeing pictures of his 3-year-old “at school,” in which “an artificial intelligence facial recognition feature puts a red square around his face.”  So are the Chinese superior at AI?  Not quite.  “Americans want to create the most powerful technology humans have ever known,” but “the Chinese want to make A.I. more practical and embedded in society,” resulting in “improving the country’s domestic quality of life” and “exporting Chinese influence.”  For better or worse, it is being used in ways that could not be implemented in America.  That means there are two races going on, each with its own leader.

Soon afterwards, we read that “China Seeks A.I. Independence, Weakening Trump’s Leverage” (Meaghan Tobin, The New York Times, May 12th).  This was about Chinese company DeepSeek announcing that “its new model had been optimized to run on chips made by the Chinese giant Huawei,” removing American ability to control their processor supply.  The chips could also be made elsewhere, as “DeepSeek is calling out into the void to… other companies, ‘Please make these changes so we can get better performance out of your chips.’”

On technical quality, “Chinese A.I. Models Close the Gap With Anthropic and OpenAI” (Cade Metz, Karen Weise and Meaghan Tobin, The New York Times, June 25th).  That’s a consensus of intuitive estimates, as though this piece printed out to ten pages it offered no substantive or quantitative justifications.  Not so different in “American A.I. Companies Say Chinese Copycats Are Quickly Catching Up (Cade Metz, July 6th, also in the Times).  Both pieces name a presumably estimated six-month AI development difference and mention “distillation” in which “researchers… collect data from a particularly powerful system and use that data to build a system that can run on less expensive hardware” - the second one concedes that “it is… not completely clear what Chinese companies are doing.”

After that, two of these authors told us that “China’s Latest A.I. Breakthrough Threatens America’s Lead" (Meagan Tobin and Cade Metz, July 17th, still the Times).  They perceived that “the Chinese startup Moonshot AI released a new A.I. model that appeared to narrow the lead held by well-funded American competitors.”  But here, “according to benchmarks run by Vals AI, an independent company that evaluates the performance of A.I. models, Kimi K3 performs just below Anthropic’s Fable 5 model while outperforming OpenAI’s flagship GPT-5.6 Sol model.”  The authors do not blame distillation, but, per “experts,” “years of operating under export controls have forced Chinese companies to innovate within tight computing constraints.”  In “Chinese A.I. Start-Up Shows the World What It Has Built” (July 27th, again in the Times), Tobin related that Kimi K3 has now been internally revealed, and “the model’s release has also inflamed a fierce debate in Beijing, Silicon Valley and Washington about whether governments should take steps to limit access to Chinese open-source models.”  There is irony there, if not a true paradox.

If all this is as significant as these “experts” say, it was valuable for Jason Hsu to tell us, in the New York Times on July 23rd, “This Is How America Trounces China in the A.I. Race.”  He said our government issuing “a ban of its own,” in response to proposed Chinese ones, would be “a mistake,” but that “American and its allies should build and deploy their own so-called open-weight models, which users can download, run and modify on their machines.”  That refers to “the billions of individual settings… that help determine how a model responds to prompts,” which most companies including OpenAI keep proprietary.  So, yes, if there is a way to stay ahead of China, which seems now a worthy goal even if our objectives are different, it’s even worth rolling out a new-to-me buzzword.  Fair is fair.

Friday, August 14, 2026

Artificial Intelligence Regulation - Three Months of… What?

A lot of small things have happened in this area since mid-May.  To what do they add up?

First, “Trump Cancels Signing of A.I. Executive Order” (Tripp Mickle and Sheera Frenkel, The New York Times, May 21st).  Another flip-flop for our president, the kind of thing that happens when he finds out only after proposing something that it won’t work.  It was “an executive order that would give the government the power to evaluate artificial intelligence models before they were publicly released.”  The cancellation was the right decision, as nothing and no one in our government could possibly do that competently.

Next, “Elizabeth Warren calls for taxing AI industry to ‘invest in people’” (Alex Nitzberg, Fox Business, about May 28th).  As I wrote in Work’s New Age 15 years ago, we may need to rearrange the sources of our tax revenues as they change in significance - for example, if the number of people working becomes greatly reduced, from efficiency, foreign competition, and automation, it would become unfair to count on them for the same share of tax collections they currently provide.  If, as Warren also said, “the tax system incentivizes replacing workers with AI,” that needs correction as soon as possible.  It is too soon for directly taxing AI to be noncontroversial, but, if AI shows clearer signs of replacing large numbers of workers, we will need to discuss that with rather more urgency.  Accordingly, Warren is right to bring up this idea now.

Moving along, per a “Fox News Poll:  Voters see AI regulation as urgent, rank safeguards ahead of innovation” (Victoria Balara, Fox News, May 28th).  Innovation is great, but there are always guardrails, and, as we should have learned from dealing with the likes of Uber and Airbnb, using new technology should not exempt firms from governmental control.  Here, “nearly 8 in 10 think is it extremely (40%) or very (37%) urgent for the government to address AI regulations.”  There is no real partisan divide there, as 83% of Democrats, 77% of Republicans, and 82% of Independents want “to prioritize protecting the public interest.”  We’ll see how the other pieces in this post support this need.

Less than two weeks after the first article here came out, we saw as “Trump signs AI order that asks companies to give government early access” (Joey Garrison, USA Today, June 2nd).  In it, the president “asks AI developers to voluntarily submit their models to the federal government to review for potential security risks.”  Although Washington “would have access to advanced AI models submitted for testing for up to 30 days - a shorter period than the 90-day window established in the draft order that Trump shelved,” that’s still a long time in the AI industry, and it is even less clear what our government can constructively accomplish.

Another effort from a different direction appeared as a “New Super PAC Aims to Rally Tech Workers to Help Limit A.I.” (Mike Isaac and Theodore Schleifer, The New York Times, June 18th).  “Two Democratic operatives are aiming to leverage the unease within the tech industry over A.I. and harness an agitated work force into a political movement.”  We do have that.  The new PAC is smaller than its opposing one, Leading the Future, but “has started deploying” its funds, “buying ads for the Democratic party in New York City’s 12th Congressional District to support Alex Bores, a former tech worker who has written A.I. safety legislation.”  No results here yet, but this organization will get support from Republicans as well.

Soon afterwards, “U.S. Presses Meta to Agree to A.I. Reviews as Security Concerns Rise
 (Tripp Mickle, Eli Tan and Sheera Frankel, The New York Times, June 23rd).  Voluntary again, and “the latest example of the administration’s efforts to step up oversight of the A.I. industry after promoting a hands-off approach to” it.  Yet “Meta is the only major U.S. developer of A.I. technology that has not reached an agreement to voluntarily share its models with the federal government for review,” so also for another reason nothing is guaranteed.

Days later, “U.S. Loosens Restrictions on Anthropic’s Mythos A.I. Model” (Sheera Frenkel, The New York Times, June 26th) was updated into “U.S. Lifts Restrictions on Anthropic’s Most Powerful A.I. Models” (Sheera Frankel and Ana Swanson, The New York Times, June 30th).  The first “move de-escalates a clash between the Trump administration and the company,” and the second extended that to all the company’s strongest products.  It should surprise no one to read that “Trump officials are still working on a framework for how companies should formally submit new A.I. models for review, and what standards they would be held to.”

On a side not as opposite as it may seem, “AI could unleash ‘single greatest productivity revolution’ if Washington avoids overreach:  report” (Sophia Compton, Fox Business, June 28th).  AI has great potential, we all can agree, but we don’t see eye-to-eye on what “overreach” would be - especially when it seems the potential overreachers are neither consistent nor effective.

Finally, something substantive!  “New York makes history with first-of-its-kind law regulating AI-powered commercials” (Julie Bonavita, Fox News, July 2nd).  “The state’s synthetic performer disclosure law, signed by Gov. Kathy Hochul in December 2025, requires advertisements featuring an AI-generated person to include a clear label indicating the individual is not real.”

 That’s it.  I found nothing else.  Now, can we create boundaries for more things, and beyond just one state?  We are collectively floundering at that.  As the survey above shows, we need, somehow, to do better with artificial intelligence regulation - and, given recent intensified concerns, do it soon.  That is our bipartisan task.

Friday, August 7, 2026

July Jobs: A Blah, Flat Report, No Better but No Worse, with AJSN Down Somewhat to 17.3 Million

The first impression many will have of this morning’s Bureau of Labor Statistics Employment Situation Summary was that it was a loser, since total nonfarm payroll employment, with a 23,000 loss, fell short of published estimates by 103,000 to 118,000. 

That’s half true.  In support of that, the two measures of how common working and being officially unemployed, the labor force participation rate and the employment-population ratio, are, each dropped 0.1% to 61.4% and 58.9%.  The count of those working part-time for economic reasons, or holding part-time jobs while looking for full-time ones, gained 100,000 to 4.8 million, and average hourly private nonfarm wages lost two cents to $37.62.  Otherwise, though, unadjusted joblessness stayed at 4.4%, and other measures logged improvements: seasonally adjusted unemployment fell 0.1% to 4.1%, there were 200,000 fewer adjusted jobless (now 6.9 million), and 100,000 fewer, 1.8 million, who had been looking for 27 weeks or longer.

The American Job Shortage Number or AJSN, the metric showing how many more positions could be quickly filled if all knew they would be easy and routine to get, came in at 167,000 lower as follows:

The largest change was a 120,000 loss from those wanting work but not looking for it for at least a year - no other differences exceeded 37,000.   The share of the AJSN from those officially unemployed edged up 0.2% to 38.7%.  Compared with a year before, the AJSN has dropped just over half a million, with the largest subtractions from those jobless and those wanting but not seeking for a year or more.

What happened here?  Nothing.  The number of people not interested in work rose 284,000, which explains the lower unemployment rate.  Otherwise, it all looks light and variable, with no trends, no big areas of concern, and no real changes.  Likewise, no progress.  The turtle stayed right where he was.